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Abstract— In the restructured electricity industry, electricity
pooling markets are an oligopoly with strategic producers pos-
sessing private information (private production cost function). We
focus on pooling markets where aggregate demand is represented
by a non-strategic agent.
Inelasticity of demand is a main difficulty in electricity markets
which can potentially result in market failure and high prices.
We consider demand to be inelastic.
We propose a market mechanism that has the following fea-
tures. (F1) It is individually rational. (F2) It is budget balanced.
(F3) It is price efficient, that is, at equilibrium the price of
electricity is equal to the marginal cost of production. (F4) The
energy production profile corresponding to every non-zero Nash
equilibrium of the game induced by the mechanism is a solution
of the corresponding centralized problem where the objective is
the maximization of the sum of the producers’ and consumers’
utilities.
We identify some open problems associated with our approach
to electricity pooling markets.
Index Terms—Oligopolistic electricity pooling markets, inelas-
tic demand, mechanism design, asymmetric information, strategic
behavior.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Motivation
Electricity markets are the heart of the industry restructur-
ing. Electricity as a trading commodity has unique features [1]
due to the physical laws (KVL, KCL) governing the power
flow, the lines’ capacity constraints, and the fact that electric
energy cannot be stored. Pooling markets have been proposed
as a solution to energy trading.
In a previous paper [2], we presented the state of the art in
the design of electricity pooling markets and discussed three
existing approaches to electricity pooling markets, namely, the
Cournot approach [3], [4], [5], [6], [7], the Bertrand approach
[6] and the supply function approach [7], [8], [9], [10], [11]. In
[2], we proposed a new approach to electricity pooling markets
with strategic producers possessing asymmetric information,
non-strategic consumers, and elastic demand.
In this paper, we study electricity pooling markets with
strategic producers possessing asymmetric information, non-
strategic consumers, and inelastic demand. Inelastic demand
is an appropriate assumption for real-time markets as well as
congested day-ahead markets [12], [13].
Electricity pooling markets with inelastic demand result in
an important and challenging problem in the restructuring of
electricity markets. Reference [14] argues that the fundamental
problem with electricity markets is that the demand is almost
completely insensitive to price fluctuations, while supply faces
binding constraints at peak times, and storage is prohibitively
costly. As a result, in a market with no demand elasticity
and strict production constraints, a firm with even a small
percentage of the market could exercise extreme market power
when demand is high. For example, in a case that ISO needs
97 percent of all generators running to meet demand, a firm
that owns 6 percent of capacity can exercise a great deal of
market power. Reference [9] studies and measures this market
power. Inelasticity of demand was the main reason for market
failure in electricity markets e.g. the California Independent
System Operator/ Power Exchange (ISO/PX) experience [14].
As a solution to problems associated wth inelastic demand,
[14] proposes long-term contracting combined with retail
market to introduce elasticity to the electricity market.
In this paper, we consider pooling markets with inelastic
demand and present a mechanism for production allocation
among strategic producers that has the following properties.
(1) It induces price-taking behavior among the producers
(i.e. it deals with the market power even small strategic
producers could exercise) (2) It incentivizes strategic producers
to collectively meet the demand. Price taking behavior is
achieved by paying each producer a price that is determined
by the price proposals of the other producers (i.e. the price
a producer is paid is independent of its own price proposal).
Furthermore, to limit the differences among the price proposals
of producers, we consider penalty terms (taxes) for differences
in price proposals. In the case of inelastic demand, total
production must not exceed the demand because the ISO wants
to maximize the social welfare (defined in Section II). The
fixed utility of demand is part of the social welfare, and the
ISO does not want the demand to pay for overproduction (i.e.
energy that is not used). To induce total energy production
equal to the fixed demand, we consider penalty terms for
underproduction and overproduction.
The key difference between the mechanisms proposed in [2]
and the mechanism presented in this paper are in the incentives
provided to strategic producers so as to participate in the
2electricity pooling market. These differences are discussed in
Section V-B.
B. Contributions of the paper
In this paper we focus on electricity pooling markets
with strategic producers possessing private information, non-
strategic (price-taking) inelastic demand, and no transmission
constraints. We adopt Nash Equilibrium (NE) as a solu-
tion/equilibrium concept; the interpretation of NE is the same
as in [15]- [16].
We propose a market mechanism which has the following
features. (F1) It is individually rational. That is, strategic
producers voluntarily participate in the pooling market. (F2)
It is budget balanced. That is the mechanism does not create
any budget surplus or any budget deficit. (F3) It is price
efficient. That is, the demand is paying a price equal to the
marginal cost of producing the next one unit of energy. (F4)
The energy production profile corresponding to every non-zero
NE of the game induced by the mechanism is a solution of
the corresponding centralized problem, i.e. the problem the
ISO would solve if it had access to the producers’ private
information. Furthermore, if zero production is the only NE
of the game induced by the mechanism, the energy production
profile corresponding to that is a solution of the corresponding
centralized optimization problem. For discussion on these
features see [2].
The mechanism/game form presented in this report is
distinctly different from currently existing mechanisms for
electricity pooling markets. There are two key differences
between our mechanism and currently existing mechanisms:
1) in terms of the type of information exchange (the
message space of the mechanism);
2) in terms of the performance.
We elaborated on these key differences in [2].
C. Organization
The rest of the paper is organized as following. The model
of the market analyzed/studied in this paper is introduced in
Section II. The objective is presented in section III. The cen-
tralized optimization problem associated with the model and
the objective is presented in Section IV. The mechanism for
inelastic demand and its analysis are presented in Section V.
Discussion of open problems associated with our approach to
electricity pooling markets appears in Section VI. The proofs
of our results are presented in Appendices A-B. An example
illustrating our approach and results appears in Appendix C.
II. THE MODEL
We consider a pooling market consisting of an ISO, N pro-
ducers, and consumers who are represented by their aggregate
demand. Let I = {1, 2, ..., N} denote the set of producers. We
make the following assumptions:
(A1) The number of of producers, N , is fixed and common
knowledge among the ISO, producers and consumers; further-
more, N > 3.
(A2) Producers are strategic and self-profit maximizers.
(A3) Each producer i has a fixed capacity xi > 0, i =
1, 2, ..., N , which is common knowledge among the producers,
the ISO and the consumers.
(A4) The cost function Ci(.), i = 1, 2, ..., N , of energy
production is producer i’s private information. Also, Ci(.) ∈
Ci, where the function space Ci is common knowledge among
producers and the ISO.
(A5) The functions Ci(.), i = 1, 2, ..., N , are convex;
furthermore, for all i, i = 1, 2, ..., N ,
Ci(0) = 0, (1)
C
′
i(ei) > 0, (2)
C
′′
i (ei) > 0, (3)
for all ei > 0, where ei denotes the amount of energy produced
by producer i, and C ′i(.) and C
′′
i (.) denote the first and second
derivatives, respectively, of Ci(.).
(A6) Producer i’s utility function is
ui(ei, ti) = −Ci(ei) + ti (4)
where ti denotes the amount of money producer i receives for
the energy it produces.
(A7) The demand is inelastic. Its amount, D0, is fixed
and common knowledge among the ISO, the producers and
the consumers. D0 is less than or equal to the sum of the
producers’ capacities.
(A8) Consumers are non-strategic, their total utility is
uD0 −
∑
i∈I
ti (5)
where uD0 is the fixed utility the consumers gain from
consuming D0 amount of energy and is a common knowledge
among ISO, producers and consumers.
∑
i∈I ti denotes the
amount of money demand should pay to the producers for the
energy consumed.
(A9) The ISO is a social welfare maximizer. From (4) and
(5) the social welfare function for the case of inelastic demand
is
W1(e1, e2, ..., eN) = uD0 −
∑
i∈I
ti −
∑
i∈I
Ci(ei) +
∑
i∈I
ti
= uD0 −
∑
i∈I
Ci(ei). (6)
Since uD0 is constant and common knowledge among the
producers, the consumers and the ISO, maximizing the social
welfare function given by is equivalent to maximizing
W2(e1, e2, ..., eN) = −
∑
i∈I
Ci(ei). (7)
(A10) No transmission constraints are taken into account in
the energy distribution.
Assumptions (A1)-(A6) and (A10) appear in [2] and they
are discussed in the same reference. Here we discuss Assump-
tions (A7)-(A9).
Inelastic demand can not change its amount of consumption
((A7)). The same observation is made in reference [17].
Inelasticity of the demand usually happens at peak demand
hours and is a more compatible assumption with real-time
3markets. The amount of inelastic demand, D0, is the aggregate
of the demand bids submitted to the pooling market by
consumers/retailers. This value of demand is then broadcasted
to the producers by the ISO. Assuming
∑
i∈I ei ≥ D0,
(A7), ensures that the producers can meet the demand with
their current capacity. This assumption is essential for market
clearing.
(A8) implies that the demand is non-strategic. Demand
does not bid in the market and does not decide on its
amount of production and its payment. Reference [18] has the
same assumption in the pooling market and argues that it is
consistent with most currently operating and proposed power
auctions.
Considering the form of the producers’ utilities as well
as the consumers’ utility, the non-profitmaker ISO aims to
maximize the social welfare defined in (6). Note that for in-
elastic demand, the excess production does not affect the utility
of the consumers and therefore, assuming
∑
i∈I ei ≥ D0,
maximizing the social welfare is equivalent to minimizing Eq.
(7), the total cost of production.
III. OBJECTIVE AND METHOD OF APPROACH
The ISO’s objective is to maximize the social welfare
function given by Eq. (6) under the constraints imposed
by (A1)-(A10) along with the requirement that the capacity
constraints of the producers are satisfied and total production
exceeds inelastic demand D0.
To achieve this objective, we proceed as follows. We first
consider the centralized optimization problem the ISO would
solve if he had perfect knowledge of the cost functions, Ci(.),
i = 1, 2, ..., N . The solution of this centralized problem
would give the best possible performance the ISO can achieve.
Afterwards, we design a mechanism/game form that possesses
properties (F1)-(F4). The above properties are obtained via the
creation of a tax function which incentivizes each strategic
producer to align his own individual objective with the social
welfare. The specification and interpretation of the mechanism
and its tax function appears in Section V.
IV. THE CENTRALIZED PROBLEM
Because of Eq. (7), the ISO’s centralized problem is
max
ei,i∈I
−
∑
i∈I
Ci(ei)
s.t. 0 ≤ ei ≤ xi∑
i∈I
ei ≥ D0. (8)
We call the above problem MAX1.
Assumptions (A3), (A5) and (A7) imply that in MAX1, the
objective function is strictly concave and the set of feasible so-
lutions is non-empty, convex and compact. Therefore, MAX1
has a unique solution, and the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT)
conditions are necessary and sufficient for optimality. The
KKT conditions are useful for the analysis of the mechanism
proposed in this paper. That is why they are presented in
Appendix A.
V. THE MECHANISM FOR INELASTIC DEMAND
We first specify the mechanism, then we interpret its el-
ements, mainly the tax function, and, finally, we study its
properties. We illustrate the mechanism via two examples that
appear in Appendix C.
A. Specification of the Mechanism
A game form/mechanism is described by (M, h), where M
is the message/strategy space and h :M→A is the outcome
function from the message space to the space A of allocations.
We consider the following mechanism.
Message space Let M be
M := (M1 ⊗M2 ⊗ ...⊗MN ), (9)
where Mi is producer i’s message space,
Mi := [0, xi]× R+, i ∈ I (10)
and mi ∈ Mi is of the form
mi = (eˆi, pi) (11)
where eˆi denotes the amount of energy producer i proposes to
produce, and pi denotes the price producer i proposes to be
paid per unit of energy it produces. Note that eˆi is restricted
by 0 ≤ eˆi ≤ xi and pi is restricted by pi ≥ 0.
Allocation Space Let A be
A := (A1 ⊗A2 ⊗ ...⊗AN ), (12)
where Ai is producer i’s allocation space
Ai := [0, xi]× R, i ∈ I, (13)
and ai ∈ Ai is of the form
ai = (ei, ti), (14)
where ei denotes the amount of energy producer i is scheduled
to produce, and ti denotes the subsidy (respectively tax)
producer i should receive (respectively pay).
Outcome function h :M→A
For each m := (m1,m2, ...,mN ) ∈M we have
h(m) = (e, t) = (e1, ..., eN , t1, ..., tN ), (15)
where
ei = eˆi (16)
ti = pi+1ei − (pi − pi+1)
2 − 2piζ
2 (17)
ζ = |D0 −
∑
i∈I
ei| (18)
pN+1 := p1. (19)
We proceed to interpret and analyze the properties of the
proposed mechanism.
4B. Interpretation of the Mechanism
Since the designer of the mechanism, i.e. ISO, can not alter
the producers’ cost functions, Ci(.), i = 1, 2, ..., N , even if he
knew their functional form, the only way it can achieve his
objective is through the use of appropriate tax incentives/tax
functions. The tax incentive of our mechanism for produce i
consists of two components, that is,
ti = ti,1 + ti,2, (20)
where
ti,1 = pi+1ei, (21)
ti,2 = −(pi − pi+1)
2 − 2piζ
2. (22)
The term ti,1 specifies the amount producer i receives for
its production ei from the demand side. It is important to note
that the price per unit of electricity energy that a producer is
paid is determined by the message/proposal of other producers.
Thus, a producer does not control the price it is paid per unit of
electricity it provides. This term induces price-taking behavior
on behalf of the producers.
The term ti,2 provides the following incentives to the
producers: (1) To bid/propose the same price per unit of
produced energy (2) To collectively propose a total electricity
supply that is equal to the demand.
The incentive provided to all producers to bid the same
price per unit of produced energy is described by the term
−(pi − pi+1)
2
, which is a positive punishment (tax) paid by
producer i for deviating from the price proposal of producer
i+ 1.
The incentive provided to all producers to collectively
propose a total production that is equal to the demand, D0,
is captured by the term −2piζ2 which is a penalty for both
underproduction and overproduction.
ti,2 can be thought of as tax payments the ISO collects from
the producers in order to align their productions with the social
welfare maximizing production.
C. Properties of the Mechanism
The properties possessed by the proposed mechanism are
described by Theorems (V.1)-(V.7) and lemma (V.1). The proof
of all these properties are presented in Appendix B.
Theorem V.1. (Existence of NE) One of the NE of the game
induced by the proposed mechanism is m∗i = (0, 0), for all
i ∈ I . The corresponding production profile and taxes at this
equilibrium are zero.
Definition V.1. We call the NE where for all i ∈ I , m∗i =
(0, 0) a trivial Nash Equilibrium. We call any other NE of the
game induced by the proposed mechanism a non-trivial NE.
Theorem V.2. (FEASIBILITY) If m∗ = (eˆ∗, p∗) =
(eˆ∗1, eˆ
∗
2, ..., eˆ
∗
N , p
∗
1, p
∗
2, ..., p
∗
N ) is a non-trivial NE of the game
induced by the proposed mechanism, then the corresponding
allocation e∗ is a feasible solution of problem MAX1, i.e.
D0 −
∑
i∈I
e∗i = 0, (23)
or, equivalently,
ζ∗ = 0. (24)
lemma V.1. Let m∗ = (e∗, p∗) be a non-trivial NE of the game
induced by the mechanism. Then for every producer i ∈ I we
have,
p∗i = p
∗
i+1 = p
∗ (25)
p∗(
∑
i∈I
e∗i −D0) = 0 (26)
t∗i = p
∗e∗i (27)
∂ti
∂ei
|m∗ = p
∗. (28)
Theorem V.3. Consider any non-trivial NE m∗ of the game
induced by the mechanism. Then, the production profile e∗
corresponding to m∗ is an optimal solution of the centralized
problem MAX1.
Theorem V.4. Consider a solution e∗ = (e∗1, e∗2, ..., e∗N ) of
the centralized problem MAX1. There exists a non-trivial NE,
m∗ = (eˆ∗1, eˆ
∗
2, ..., eˆ
∗
N , p
∗
1, p
∗
2, ..., p
∗
N ) of the game induced by
the mechanism such that the production profile corresponding
to m∗ is equal to e∗.
Theorems (V.1) and (V.4) show the game induced by the
mechanism has a set of NE consisting of all the solutions to
the centralized problem plus a trivial NE of all zero prices
and all zero productions. Since problem MAX1 has exactly
one solution, which is of course with non-zero aggregate
production, we can infer that every game induced by the
mechanism has exactly two NE, one trivial and one non-trivial.
Theorem V.5. (INDIVIDUAL RATIONALITY) The proposed
game form is individually rational, that is at every NE of the
game induced by the mechanism, the corresponding allocation
(e∗, t∗) is weakly preferred by all producers to the initial
allocation (0, 0).
Note that by Theorem (V.5), the trivial NE, i.e. zero pro-
ductions and zero payments, is Pareto dominated by any other
NE of the game.
Theorem V.6. (BUDGET BALANCE) The mechanism is bud-
get balanced both at equilibrium and off equilibrium, that is
the payments from all producers and consumers sum up to
zero.
Theorem V.7. (PRICE EFFICIENCY) The mechanism is price
efficient; that is at equilibrium, the demand is paying a price
equal to the marginal cost of the next one unit of production.
The result of Theorem (V.7) shows that the game induced
by the proposed mechanism incentivizes the producers to
reveal the true marginal cost of production of the system at
equilibrium.
VI. CONCLUSION AND REFLECTIONS
Electricity restructuring has changed the industry from
a monopoly into an oligopoly where energy producers are
strategic players with private information and market power.
In this new environment, electricity can be traded through
5bilateral contracts or pooling markets. In this paper we focused
on pooling markets with strategic producers possessing private
information, non-strategic consumers with inelastic demand,
and no transmission constraints. We designed a mechanism
which has properties (F1)-(F4). We observed that the ISO’s
centralized problem of social welfare maximization has a
unique solution and this unique solution is the same as the
allocation corresponding to the unique non-trivial NE of the
game induced by the mechanism. Achieving these features all
together distinguishes our mechanism from any other market
design available in the literature. It is worth noting that price
efficiency is achieved even though customers (represented by
their aggregate demand) are not strategic and the demand side
is inelastic.
The intuition behind the proposed mechanism is the fol-
lowing. The primary considerations/goals in the design of a
mechanism for the problem considered in this paper are : (1)
Dealing with the strategic producers’ market power resulting
from the inelasticity of the demand and the non-strategic con-
sumers. (2) Incentivizing the strategic producers to collectively
meet the demand. The producers’ market power is addressed
by offering each producer a price per unit of its produced
energy that does not depend on its own price proposal, that
is, it is not under its own control; such an offer induces price-
taking behavior among the producers. Incentivization of the
strategic producers to collectively meet the demand is achieved
by the specification of taxes that penalize over-production and
under-production. In addition to achieving the above goals, the
proposed mechanism possesses other desirable features such
as (F1)-(F4).
We now contrast the mechanism in this paper with the
market mechanism for elastic demand proposed by the authors
in [2]. The differences appear in the specification of the tax
function which provides incentives to strategic producers to
align their interests/goals with those of the ISO. There are two
key differences in the tax function of the elastic and inelastic
demand. (1) In the case of elastic demand, the price consumers
pay defines the amount of energy they consume. Thus, each
consumer must pay an amount of money that is equal to the
amount of energy it consumes times the price per unit of
energy. This implies that in order to achieve budget balance,
money must be exchanged among the strategic producers. That
is, we must have
∑
i∈I ti = p
∑
i∈I ei. This requirement
necessitates the presence of the term ti,3 = −(pi+1 − pi+2)2
in the tax function of every strategic producer. The term ti,3
does not depend on producer i’s message mi = (ei, pi),
thus, it does not alter its strategic behavior, furthermore the
presence of the terms ti,3, i ∈ I , collectively results in
budget balance. In the case of inelastic demand, consumers
are willing to pay any amount of money to get the desired
amount of energy. Therefore, budget balance can be achieved
without any money exchanged among the strategic producers,
and the presence of the terms that are the analogue to the
ti,3, i ∈ I , is in not necessary. The consumers’ utility is
ud(D0)−
∑
i∈I(ti,1 + ti,2), the total subsidy received by the
strategic producers is
∑
i∈I(ti,1 + ti,2) and the mechanism is
budget balance. (2) The two mechanisms are different in the
way agents contributing to the tax payment imposed for feasi-
ble allocation at equilibrium. In both cases, elastic and inelastic
demand, the total tax
∑
i∈I piζ
2 is imposed on all strategic
producers to collectively propose production profiles which
are feasible at equilibrium. However, the contribution of each
producer to the tax
∑
i∈I piζ
2 is different in the two cases. In
the case of elastic demand, producer i’s contribution is pi+1ζ2;
when demand is inelastic, producer i’s contribution is piζ2.
The reason for this difference is the following. In order for the
tax
∑
i∈I piζ
2 to achieve its goal, each producer’s contribution
must depend on its proposed price, so that its contribution
depends on its whole message proposed i.e. production and
price. In the case of elastic demand, ζ = |D(p)−
∑
i∈I ei| does
depend on the proposed price vector p := (p1, p2, ..., pN ),
hence on pi, and the goal of the tax
∑
i∈I ζ
2 is achieved by
defining producer i’s contribution to this tax to be pi+1ζ2. 1
In the case of inelastic demand, ζ = |D0 −
∑
i∈I ei| does
not depend on prices and hence pi, thus, if
∑
i∈I piζ
2 is the
total tax required for achieving feasible production profiles at
equilibrium, producer i’s contribution must be piζ2.
The game form presented in this paper ensures that the
desired allocations are achieved at equilibria without speci-
fying how an equilibrium is reached. In [2], we discussed
the difficulties associated with the discovery of algorithms
(tatonment processes) that guarantee convergence to NE of
the game induced by the mechanism.
Future problems along this line of research presented in this
paper include the incorporation of transmission constraints into
the model, the design of dynamic mechanisms for markets that
evolve over time, and the design of market mechanisms that
work under both elastic and inelastic demand.
Acknowledgment: This research was supported in part
by NSF Grant CNS-1238962. The authors thank Hamidreza
Tavafoghi for many useful discussions.
APPENDIX A
THE KARUSH-KUHN-TACKER CONDITION FOR
PROBLEM MAX1
The Lagrangian for MAX1 is
LMAX1 = −
∑
i∈I
Ci(ei) + λ(
∑
i∈I
ei −D0)
+
∑
i∈I
µi(xi − ei) +
∑
i∈I
νiei, (29)
and KKT conditions are
∂Ci
∂ei
∣∣∣∣
e∗
− λ∗ + µ∗i − ν
∗
i = 0 ∀i ∈ I, (30)
λ∗(
∑
i
e∗i −D0) = 0, (31)
µ∗i (xi − e
∗
i ) = 0 ∀i ∈ I, (32)
ν∗i e
∗
i = 0 ∀i ∈ I, (33)
λ∗i ≥ 0, (34)
ν∗i ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ I, (35)
µ∗i ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ I. (36)
1In this case, designing producer i’s contribution to be piζ2 does not result
in feasible allocation at equilibrium. Thus the tax term
∑
i∈I
piζ
2 imposed
on the strategic producers does not incentivize them to collectively propose
feasible allocation at equilibrium.
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PROOF OF THEOREMS (V.1)-(V.7) AND OF LEMMA (V.1)
Proof of Theorem V.1 Consider producer i and let m∗j =
(0, 0) ∀j 6= i. Now note that since p∗i+1 = 0, producer i
is paid no compensation for his production, i.e. p∗i+1ei=0.
Other terms in the utility function including the cost of
production and penalty terms in the tax function are non-
positive. Therefore, the utility of producer i is always non-
positive and proposing mi = (0, 0) gives producer i a utility
of 0 which is his best response.
Proof of Theorem V.2
Consider two cases.
Case 1: For all i ∈ I , p∗i > 0.
Here, p∗i ≥ 0 is not binding. Therefore, at NE, for all i ∈ I ,
∂ui
∂pi
∣∣∣∣
m∗
=
∂ti
∂pi
∣∣∣∣
m∗
=
−2(p∗i − p
∗
i+1)− 2ζ
∗2 = 0. (37)
Summing up Eq. (37) over all i we get:
∑
i∈I
∂ti
∂pi
∣∣∣∣
m∗
=
∑
i∈I
[−2(p∗i − p
∗
i+1)− 2ζ
∗2]
= −2Nζ∗2 = 0. (38)
But the last equation is achieved if and only if ζ∗ = 0, i.e. if
and only if
∑
i e
∗
i = D0.
Case 2: ∃i ∈ I s.t. p∗i = 0.
We prove that this case can not be a non-trivial NE.
Since pi ≥ 0 is binding here, at NE we must have
∂ui
∂pi
∣∣∣∣
m∗
≤ 0. (39)
Furthermore, using p∗i = 0 in Eq. (37) we obtain
∂ui
∂pi
∣∣∣∣
m∗
= 2[p∗i+1 − ζ
∗2] ≤ 0. (40)
Now assume p∗i+1 > 0. Then, from (37),
∂ui+1
∂pi+1
∣∣∣∣
m∗
= 2(p∗i+2 − p
∗
i+1)− 2ζ
∗2 = 0 (41)
From (41) it follows that
p∗i+2 = p
∗
i+1 + ζ
∗2 ≥ p∗i+1 > 0. (42)
Following the same argument, we obtain
p∗i = p
∗
i+1 +Nζ
∗2 > 0. (43)
This contradicts the assumption of p∗i = 0. As a result, we
should have p∗i+1 = 0. Repeating the above argument we
obtain p∗j = 0, ∀j ∈ I .
Next, if p∗i = p∗i+1 = 0, then from the utility function
of producer i, it is clear that his best production amount is
e∗i = 0. In the same way, e∗j = 0, ∀j ∈ I . But the bundle of
zero production and zero price proposal for all producers is in
contradiction with the assumption of non-trivial NE.
Proof of Lemma V.1 First note that from proof of Theorem
V.2, for any non-trivial NE, we have p∗i > 0, ∀i ∈ I . Using
Eq. (24) in Eq. (37) we obtain
∂ti
∂pi
∣∣∣∣
m∗
= −2(p∗i − p
∗
i+1) = 0. (44)
Therefore,
p∗i = p
∗
i+1 = p
∗ ∀i ∈ I. (45)
Next, from (23), we get [∑i∈I e∗i −D0] = 0, therefore,
p∗[
∑
i∈I
e∗i −D0] = 0 ∀i ∈ I. (46)
Finally, Eqs. (17), (24) and (45) imply
t∗i = p
∗e∗i , (47)
and
∂ti
∂ei
∣∣∣∣
m∗
= p∗ − 2p∗ζ∗
∂ζ∗
∂ei
= p∗. (48)
Proof of Theorem V.3 Let m∗ = (eˆ∗, p∗) =
(eˆ∗1, eˆ
∗
2, ..., eˆ
∗
N , p
∗
1, p
∗
2, ..., p
∗
N ) be a NE of the game induced
by the mechanism. Then, m∗ is a solution to every producer’s
profit maximization problem, that is,
(eˆ∗i , p
∗
i ) = argmax
eˆi,pi
−Ci(eˆi) + ti
s.t 0 ≤ eˆi ≤ xi (49)
pi ≥ 0. (50)
Call this problem MAX2. The Lagrangian for this problem is
LMAX2 = −Ci(eˆi) + ti + µˆi(xi − eˆi) + νˆieˆi + θˆipi (51)
and the KKT conditions are, ∀i ∈ I ,
−
∂Ci
∂eˆi
∣∣∣∣
m∗
+
∂ti
∂eˆi
∣∣∣∣
m∗
− µˆ∗i + νˆ
∗
i = 0, (52)
∂ti
∂pi
|m∗ + θˆ
∗
i = 0, (53)
µˆ∗i (xi − eˆ
∗
i ) = 0, (54)
νˆ∗i eˆ
∗
i = 0, (55)
θˆ∗i p
∗
i = 0, (56)
νˆ∗i ≥ 0, (57)
µˆ∗i ≥ 0, (58)
θˆ∗i ≥ 0. (59)
To show that the allocation e∗i = eˆ∗i , i ∈ I , corresponding
to m∗ is a solution of the centralized problem MAX2, we
construct the KKT parameters of the centralized problem
based on the producers’ profit maximization KKT parameters
as follows.
λ∗ = p∗, (60)
µ∗i = µˆ
∗
i ∀i ∈ I, (61)
ν∗i = νˆ
∗
i ∀i ∈ I. (62)
Then, Eqs. (52)-(59) along with lemma V.1 show that Eqs.
(30)-(36) are satisfied. The assertion of Theorem (V.3) follows,
since m∗ is an arbitrary non-trivial NE of the game induced
by the mechanism.
7Proof of Theorem V.4 Consider the KKT conditions for
problem MAX2 expressed by Eqs. (30)-(36) and set, ∀i ∈ I ,
p∗i = λ
∗, (63)
µˆ∗i = µ
∗
i , (64)
νˆ∗i = ν
∗
i , (65)
θˆ∗i = 0. (66)
Eqs. (30)-(36) show that Eqs. (52)-(59) are satisfied under the
above selection.
Proof of Theorem V.5
Consider 3 cases.
Case 1: e∗i = 0.
Then Eq. (27) results in
ui(e
∗, p∗) = −Ci(e∗i )− t∗i = −Ci(0)− p∗i × 0 = 0. (67)
Therefore, the NE outcome is weakly preferred to the initial
allocation.
Case 2: 0 < e∗i < xi.
The constraint in Eq. (49) is not binding and therefore the
corresponding µˆ∗i and νˆ∗i are 0. Then, Eqs. (27), (28) and (52)
along with µˆ∗i = νˆ∗i = 0 result in
ui(e
∗, p∗) = −Ci(e∗i ) + t∗i = −Ci(e∗i ) + C
′
i(e
∗
i )e
∗
i . (68)
Furthermore, from (1)-(3), for the convex and increasing
function Ci
Ci(ei) < C
′
i(ei)ei for any ei > 0. (69)
Combining (68) and (69) we get,
ui(e
∗, t∗) = −Ci(e∗i ) + C
′
i(e
∗
i )e
∗
i > 0. (70)
Case 3: e∗i = xi.
Since the constraint ei ≤ xi is binding, µˆ∗i > 0, νˆ∗i = 0,
and Eqs. (1), (2), (28) and (52) imply
p∗ =
∂ti
∂ei
= C
′
i(e
∗
i ) + µˆ
∗ > C
′
i(e
∗
i ). (71)
Inequality (71) along with (27) and (69) result in
ui(e
∗, t∗)− Ci(e∗i ) + t
∗
i =
−Ci(e
∗
i ) + p
∗e∗i > −Ci(e
∗
i ) + C
′
i(e
∗
i )e
∗
i > 0. (72)
Proof of Theorem V.6
Producer i receives ti and demand pays
∑
i∈I ti. Therefore,
the sum of all payments adds up to zero at every message
proposal.
Proof of Theorem V.7
Consider producer i ∈ I for which the production capacity
constraints are not binding, i.e. 0 < e∗i < xi; therefore, µˆ∗i =
νˆ∗i = 0 in Eq. (52). This along with Eq. (28) imply that
p∗ = p∗i = u
′
d(
∑
i∈I
e∗i ). (73)
Then, because of Eq. (27)
∑
i
t∗i = p
∗ ×
∑
i
e∗i , (74)
which along with (73) means that the demand side pays
marginal cost of production multiplied by quantity.
APPENDIX C
EXAMPLE FOR ELECTRICITY POOLING MARKET WITH
INELASTIC DEMAND
Here, we provide an example of electricity pooling market
with inelastic demand.
As we proposed in Section VI, we currently don’t have
an algorithm for computing the NE of the game induced
by the mechanism. Nevertheless, we have proven that the
production profiles corresponding to all non-trivial NE of the
game induced by the mechanism are optimal solutions of the
corresponding centralized problems. Thus, we obtain these
production profiles as the solution of the centralized problem.
Example C.1. Consider a network of four producers with
following cost functions
C1(e1) = 2e1 + e
2
1 (75)
C2(e2) = 3e2 + e
3
2 (76)
C3(e3) = 4e3 + e
4
3 (77)
C4(e4) = 5e4 + e
2
4 (78)
and the following capacities,
x1 = x2 = x3 = x4 = 2. (79)
The demand is inelastic with D0 = 4MWh.
The social welfare function, Eq. (6), will be
W (e1, e2, ..., e4, D0) = ud(D0)−
∑
i=1,2,...,4
Ci(ei) =
ud(D0)− [2e1 + e
2
1 + 3e2 + e
3
2 + 4e3 + e
4
3 + 5e4 + e
2
4]. (80)
and the corresponding problem MAX1 is
max
ei,i∈I
− [2e1 + e
2
1 + 3e2 + e
3
2 + 4e3 + e
4
3 + 5e4 + e
2
4]
s.t.0 ≤ ei ≤ 2∑
i∈I
ei ≥ 4.
Solving the above maximization, the optimal procurement is
as follows.
e∗1 = 2 (81)
e∗2 = 1.12 (82)
e∗3 = 0.88 (83)
e∗4 = 0 (84)
The corresponding game form induced by the mechanism
designed for inelastic demand has the following form:
Message space
Mi := [0, 2]× R+, i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} (85)
and mi ∈Mi is of the form
mi = (eˆi, pi) (86)
where eˆi denotes the amount of energy producer i proposes
to produce, and pi denotes the price producer i demands per
unit of energy.
Allocation Space
8Let A be
A := (A1 ⊗A2 ⊗ ...⊗AN ), (87)
where Ai is producer i’s allocation space
Ai := [0, 2]× R, i ∈ I, (88)
and ai ∈ Ai is of the form
ai = (ei, ti), (89)
where ei denotes the amount of energy producer i is scheduled
to produce, and ti denotes the subsidy (respectively tax)
producer i should receive (respectively pay).
Outcome function h :M→A
For each m ∈ M we have
h(m) = (e, t) = (e1, ..., eN , t1, ..., tN ) (90)
where
ei = eˆi (91)
ti = pi+1ei − (pi − pi+1)
2 − 2piζ
2 (92)
ζ = |0, D0 −
∑
i∈I
ei|
= |4−
∑
i∈I
ei| (93)
p5 := p1. (94)
We proceed to interpret the mechanism and to analyze its
properties.
This game has a NE of the form eˆ∗i = e∗i , p∗i = p∗. Note that
here the first producer capacity limit is binding. The producer
4 also has a binding production constraint but from below.
The price will be the marginal cost of production, which is
the marginal cost of production of the second and the third
producers. The price and the tax payments at equilibrium will
be the following.
p∗ =
∂C2
∂e2
∣∣∣∣
e∗
=
∂C3
∂e3
∣∣∣∣
e∗
= 6.5$/MWh (95)
t∗1 = 13$ (96)
t∗2 = 7.28$ (97)
t∗3 = 5.72$ (98)
t∗4 = 0$ (99)
Form Eqs. (4), the utility of producers at equilibrium is the
following.
u1 = 5$ (100)
u2 = 2.53$ (101)
u3 = 1.59$ (102)
u4 = 0$ (103)
The outcome of the game form is individually rational, budget
balanced and price efficient.
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